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The “Missing Link” 
Space, Race, and Transoceanic Ties in the Settler-Colonial Pacific 
Frances Steel, University of Wollongong 
 
Abstract: The inauguration of a steamship route between Canada and Australia, described as 
the “missing link,” was envisaged to complete Britain’s imperial circuit of the globe. This 
article examines the early proposals and projects for a service between Vancouver and 
Sydney, which finally commenced in 1893. The route was more than a means of physically 
bridging the gulf between Canada and Australia. Serving as a conduit for ideologies and 
expectations, it became a key element of aspirations to reconfigure the Pacific as a natural 
domain for the extension of settler-colonial power and influence. In centering the “white” 
Pacific and relations between white colonies in empire, the route’s early history, although one 
of friction and contestation, offers new insights into settler-colonial mobilities beyond 
dominant themes of metropole–colony migration. 
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 “According to our ordinary habit of thought,” observed Scottish-Canadian engineer and 
inventor, Sir Sandford Fleming in 1887, Canada and Australia were “at opposite ends of the 
Colonial Empire, and are as far asunder as it is possible on this globe for two countries to be 
situated.”
1
 Never heretofore linked by ocean travel, routes of migration to them from Britain 
stretched in opposite directions across the Atlantic and Indian oceans. Canada and Australia 
were separated besides by 300 degrees of longitude. Yet when looking across the Pacific, “by 
actual fact they are only 60 degrees asunder.” If the “agencies of steam and electricity” were 
applied to this ocean, Fleming enthused, Canada and Australia, “already one in language . . . 
 




 In the last decades of the nineteenth century, perceptions of time and space contracted 
dramatically in response to the reach of industrial transport and communications. This 
engendered “new imaginative possibilities” for the British Empire, as historian Duncan Bell 
summarizes, insofar as distance posed less of an obstacle to realizing an integrated and 
unified whole, rather than a loose conglomeration of sea-sundered outposts.
3
 Fleming made 
his remarks to delegates at the first Colonial Conference of 1887, a forum where imperial and 
colonial statesmen debated the possibilities of opening new mail and telegraph 
communications. A steamship network to bridge Vancouver and Sydney, touted as the 
“missing link” or “last great link” in the British Empire, promised to materialize affinities 
between Canada and its “sister” colonies in Australasia, altering conceptualizations of the 
settler empire and its Pacific domain. 
Settler-colonial mobilities are readily framed through the lens of migration, 
foregrounding the original transoceanic passages from the British metropole to its far-flung 
settlements across Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and parts of South Africa.
4
 These 
formative “first crossings” of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans kept the Pacific at the margins 
of British imperial thought and space, as Fleming recognized at the time and as national 
historiographies have reinforced since. Histories of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada 
developed over the twentieth century largely in isolation from one another, plotting self-
enclosed narratives of development from colony to nation. A preoccupation with national 
maturation and the gradual severance of ties with Britain and the wider empire accorded little 
room for themes of enduring intra-imperial circulation and exchange. At the same time, 
settler-colonial attitudes to other routes of international migration also figured the Pacific as 
more barrier than bridge. From the 1870s Britain’s self-governing settler societies imposed 
 
increasingly restrictive legislative barriers to the entry of peoples deemed undesirable, 
particularly “Asiatics,” notably Chinese who, alongside British migrants, were on the move 
in significant numbers in this period. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada shared with each 
other and with the United States a commitment to building “white men’s countries” around 
what has since come to be termed the Pacific rim.
5
 
In this article I aim to recenter the Pacific by examining the discursive processes and 
material practices that transformed the ocean as a medium of settler-colonial mobility, 
connection, and competition. In moving beyond mobility as one-way mass migration from 
metropole to colony, I explore the ways in which settler colonies promoted ongoing 
transoceanic connectivities, the perpetual “lifeblood” of empire, as Tony Ballantyne has 
recently stressed.
6
 I draw principally on public debates over the inauguration and early 
operation of a new sea route. The Canadian Australian (CA) Line, famous as the “All Red” 
Route, opened in 1893. It initially linked the ports of Sydney, Brisbane, Suva, Honolulu, 
Victoria, and Vancouver, with Auckland later replacing Brisbane. It was intended as the 
transpacific link in a longer imperial chain, part of an integrated service to connect with the 
Canadian Pacific Rail at Vancouver and transatlantic steamships to Britain. Designated “All 
Red,” in keeping with the cartographic depiction of Britain’s global imperial reach, the 
service would be entirely under British control and connect British territories.
7
 While 
integrating the Pacific into a wider imperial circuit, it also created space for the self-
governing colonies to imagine new futures within this oceanic realm, often in ways that 
tested British metropolitan priorities and concerns. 
Connections between settler colonies have not wholly eluded historical attention. The 
scholarly platform of the British World emerged in the late 1990s, partly in response to the 
“new imperial history” with its emphasis on metropole–colony exchange and, more 
particularly, the colonial imprint in Britain and the construction of racial difference. British 
 
World proponents perceived in this work a relative neglect of the former white Dominions 
and looked to the spread and adaptation of shared “British” institutions, cultures, and 
identities within and between them. This scholarship emphasizes the “plethora of networks,” 
including familial, professional, religious, and educational ties, that bound white settlers 
closer to each other and to the United Kingdom from the late nineteenth century.
8
 It has, 
however, bypassed maritime networks and connections, and associated patterns and cultures 
of mobility across the oceanic empire. This relative neglect might be explained by the fact 
that transoceanic routes typically interrupted the “British world” by linking settler colonies 
via the dependent, nonwhite empire, as well as more ambiguous extra-imperial spaces. 
At the same time, an extensive, if disparate, literature probes the relationship between 
empire and the maritime world. Histories of prominent shipping companies, key 
entrepreneurs and their commercial and political milieu are grounded in traditions of business 
and economic history.
9
 Drawing on wider interdisciplinary influences, sea-focused histories 
of empire labor, trade, travel, and tourism continue to expand the scope and range of 
knowledge.
10
 Processes and practices of transoceanic movement and exchange implicitly 
drive all these histories, yet the specific networks that connect, and mobility itself, are seldom 
key categories of analysis. In the Pacific World context, I have explored how the Australasian 
colonies harnessed the power of steam from the early 1870s to advance a range of 
commercial and cultural influences among islands in the southwest Pacific, demonstrating the 
extent to which settlers rather than the metropole drove British expansionism in the region.
11
 
I build on this work to chart steam’s promise in relation to longer-distance, transpacific 
connections, as the ocean was reimagined and reconfigured in larger ways as a commons and 
a new frontier. 
Routes were as much systems of knowledge and representation as physical 
infrastructures. An emphasis on the material and immaterial, the functional and ideational, 
 
lies at the heart of new histories of transport enriched by perspectives from mobilities studies. 
Such work examines the role of transport “in constituting individuals, communities and 
societies in ways that go beyond the functional movement of goods and people.”
12
 In pushing 
beyond older emphases on material production, many studies center moving subjects and 
contested cultures of use. In focusing on the production end to explore the ways in which 
debates over a sea route produced space in the (imagined) act of bridging it, this article 
attempts also to bridge material, subjective, and cultural frames of study.
13
 
British settlers expressed and understood empire belonging in the late nineteenth 
century in diverse and multiple ways: through ideas and emotions, networks and exchange, 
and from specific locations, as historian Tamson Pietsch elaborates. These were “imagined, 
material and local British worlds” that reflected people’s “lived experience of the globalizing 
connections of the period.”
14
 Drawing on these insights, I explore the multiple “worlds” of a 
specific corridor of imperial traffic. The CA Line was simultaneously ideational, material, 
and locally situated, leaving its “binding” power subject to competing and sometimes-
incompatible aims. Colonial and imperial statesmen, newspaper editors, and shipping 
magnates articulated its import through appeals to sentiment and ideals of racial affinity, to 
speed or the prospect of opening new markets, and to the leverage it offered specific places in 
their relations with one another, the metropole, and sites beyond empire, notably the United 
States. Settler-colonial locations in the Pacific and the options open to them were different: 
Australia straddled two oceans and also prioritized imperial connections via the Indian 
Ocean; New Zealand was moored in the Pacific and transpacific pathways represented 
primary lifelines; Pacific connections did not bring Canada closer to Britain, but promised to 
center the colony in empire in new ways. In addition to overarching frames and conflicts of 
colonial, national, and imperial politics, commercial concerns introduced their own set of 
complications. Route ownership and itineraries changed, subsidies were committed, 
 
withdrawn, and renegotiated. The CA Line was an ongoing debate rather than a clear 
achievement, for ideology and pragmatics were not seamlessly aligned. 
In an analysis of debates over a proposed rail corridor in Chicago, urban geographer 
Julie Cidell deploys the term “trainspace” as “a way to think through conflicts over 
transportation infrastructure in relation to the places it passes through and connects.” She 
shows that trainspace was more than the material structures of tracks and railcars, and 
extended from places to networks to scales. Different actors constructed and mobilized these 
multiple spatialities differently, and contests over spatial boundaries and their character were 
always larger political struggles.
15
 The “steamer-space” produced in the Canadian Australian 
Line, as I go on to discuss, was similarly a site of connectivity and contestation, a highly 
politicized materialization engaging spatial scales from ports, colonies, nations, and oceans, 
and tying them to wider visions of the Pacific in a global settler empire.  
 
The Making of the “All Red” Route 
The impetus to draw Vancouver and Sydney closer together by steam aligned with wider 
metropolitan ambitions, at their height between the 1870s and 1900s, to consolidate and 
formalize the bonds between Britain and its self-governing empire. Appeals to a “Greater 
Britain”—the title of radical British MP Charles Dilke’s 1868 travelogue, but greatly 
popularized by Cambridge historian J. R. Seeley’s The Expansion of England (1883)— 
mapped Britain, not as a narrow island nation, but as an expansive, globalizing polity 
encompassing the colonies of mass British settlement. Unlike other European empires, 
Britain’s overseas territories had a unique edge, Seeley argued, because of an “ethnological 
unity.” Transplanted British subjects were perceived as united in their cultural and political 
outlook, sharing traits, traditions, beliefs, and institutions common to English peoples. Rival 
European powers and an expanding United States posed a potential threat on the world stage; 
 
the time appeared ripe to mobilize this “powerful global British national identity” to 
formalize and strengthen “an enduring Greater Britain.”
16
 
 Appeals to the unity of the Anglo-British Empire gained widespread interest among 
the intellectual and political elite, generating extended debate about how best to achieve and 
sustain it. Proposals ranged from consolidating existing ties to more radical constitutional 
reform, notably the formation of an Imperial Federation. This entailed establishing a single 
state and a parliamentary system of universal representation. Such visions arose in the context 
of improvements in industrial technologies of transport and communication. The altered 
material conditions of empire, insofar as previously far-flung possessions were now 
“effectively contiguous” with railroads, steamships, and the telegraph, opened up practical 
possibilities for novel political association.
17
 
 Existing work on Greater Britain typically discusses these binding technologies in 
spatially undifferentiated terms, yet they had particular import in the Pacific, an ocean 
bordered by Britain’s largest white settler colonies in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as 
well as one of its rivals, the United States. An “All Red” route to link the former became 
easier to envisage after the completion of the transcontinental railway in 1885. A nation-
building project to bridge Canada’s Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the railway also represented 
Canada’s emergence as a power “with a direct interest in the Pacific,” promoting interest in 
its westward transoceanic extension to settlements in Australasia.
18
 Some advocates linked 
this scheme directly to campaigns for Imperial Federation. For instance, the Canadian 
colonist and author Thaddeus H. W. Leavitt, who lived for a time in Australia (and edited 
Australian Representative Men), argued in a letter to the Melbourne Argus in 1886 that 
Australia would take a “practical step in the federation of the empire” by supporting the 
transpacific route, and a correspondent to the Times believed that the route “would afford a 
much greater prospect of a real federation than could be expected to result from appeals or 
 
arguments based on the claims of kinship alone.”
19
 Imperial Federation was predictably never 
realized for lack of parliamentary traction in Britain, and self-governing colonies’ fears for 
their autonomy. Imperial Federation also represented the utopian end of broader aspirations 
for imperial “consolidation” and unity, that is, a binding together of interests without 
significant political and constitutional implications, through which colonial support for the 
“All Red” route was mobilized. This mirrored the fact that although Greater Britain was not 




The 1887 Colonial Conference endorsed the desirability of the scheme, yet this did 
not bind governments to it. Running a scheduled liner network, where ships left set ports at 
set times regardless of passenger numbers or freight offering, was an enormously expensive 
proposition. Shipping companies relied on government subsidies to undertake such ventures. 
In 1893 the Australian shipping entrepreneur James Huddart secured a Canadian subsidy of 
£25,000 per annum to connect Sydney and Vancouver (one of a number of subsidies Canada 
proposed to attract traffic to the railroad). Huddart needed to raise more subsidies to secure 
the viability of the CA Line, and lobbied New South Wales (NSW) and Queensland for 
£20,000 at the height of a colonial depression (he dropped Brisbane as a port of call after 
Queensland could not raise funds). NSW granted £10,000, perceiving the route’s value in 
opening new trade with Canada and cementing its status “as the centre of the great 
Australasian group.” Racial kinship and brotherhood with Canada also figured prominently in 
NSW legislative council debates over subsidies. Free traders like the businessman and 
legislator Bruce Smith rejected such talk as “windy subjects more suitable for a debating 
society than for a house of parliament.”
21
 Yet for others such as the liberal statesman and 
five-time premier of NSW, Sir Henry Parkes, who had advocated for transpacific mail routes 
from the late 1850s, Canada was “part of the great empire to which we belong” and he failed 
 
to see how one nation could approach another “without the existence of human sentiment . . . 
sentiment enters into the very highest form of civilisation.”
22
 His assertions aligned Parkes 
with the metropolitan promoters of Greater Britain, for whom sentiment had real “political 
efficacy” and was understood as “the very foundation stone of the global polity.”
23
 
Settler colonies understood their locations and priorities in empire in multiple ways 
and it soon became clear that the route’s binding power held multiple interpretative 
possibilities. The CA Line omitted a call at New Zealand, yet the colony sought inclusion (in 
exchange for a subsidy) along what it perceived as its “natural line of communication” to 
Britain, as representative Alfred Lee Smith, a prominent Dunedin businessman recently 
appointed to the New Zealand Legislative Council (Upper House), argued at the 1894 
Colonial Conference. Existing networks to Britain across the Indian Ocean terminated in 
Australia, leaving New Zealand at the farthest possible point from London, reliant on branch 
services across the Tasman Sea to connect at Australian ports. From an Australian 
perspective, however, New Zealand’s inclusion on the CA Line would represent a “detour,” 
for the colony did not lie “in the direct line of communication” between Vancouver and 
Sydney. A New Zealand port would add days to the service and undermine the speedy 
carriage of mails and passengers to and from Australia. Yet without New Zealand’s inclusion, 
Smith declared, the imperial point of view (meaning the consolidation of the empire) 
“vanishes into thin air.”
24
 Pressed on whether he intended the route to achieve speed, foster 
sentiment, or encourage commerce, Huddart segmented the service, designating the Atlantic 
as the ocean for swift passage and looked at the Pacific from “a federal point of view.” On 
this basis, New Zealand, “the third colony of the Empire,” should be included.
25
 Australian 
opposition left New Zealand reliant on a branch connection from Auckland to join the 
transpacific steamer at Suva, the Fiji Islands more centrally placed in the western Pacific. The 
 
colony also depended on a parallel connection established in the 1870s between Sydney and 
San Francisco for the carriage of imperial mails, a point I return to later. 
In these debates, timetable imperatives defined locational advantage and disadvantage 
in the Pacific. Appeals to civilization and race did so in other ways. The Australian colonies, 
out of place in their physical proximity to Asia, might through the CA Line enjoy a direct link 
to their “correct” cultural hemisphere. The Southern Hemisphere, peopled “by coloured, 
inferior, partly civilized races,” left the British of the South “out of that world which means 
history, population, wealth, power and culture,” lamented Huddart’s agent and route 
promoter, journalist Frederick Ward, to an audience in Vancouver. “It will be good for us 
Southerners to have the feeling of race quickened by the contact of travel amongst the British 
of the North.” This route reminded them that they shared with Canadians the “great task” of 
“subduing and replenishing” the earth. Traveling across Canada from west to east offered 
instructive history lessons. Conditions in western Canada mirrored the Australian frontier; 
further east travelers would find “an older America,” with civilization built up over many 
generations: “We simple youth of the South, we children of a half-century,” he enthused, 
“should be made wiser by coming amongst you.”
26
 
This imagined relationship between race and the production of space bound together 
the white settler colonies in empire. By facilitating exchanges and learning between them, the 
CA Line and its racialized imaginaries of mobility consolidated the elevated status of 
Australia and Canada in empire. British commentators also perceived such merits. “Every 
steerage passenger” traveling by this route to and from the Antipodes could observe firsthand 
Canada’s agricultural progress and the “facilities and opportunities offered to enterprise 
within the Empire.” They might thereby recognize the value of their own future labor to the 
“unity of Empire.” The ocean routes via Suez and the Cape of Good Hope communicated the 
importance of British mastery of the seas. The “All Red” route, in placing Canada “upon a 
 
common highway,” added “conceptions of territorial settlement” to everyday understandings 
of Britain’s globe-spanning dominance.
27
 The choice and direction of route, and not simply 
the more abstract prerogative of unfettered mobility, bolstered the image of the white settler 
on the move as the engine of empire progress. 
Such considerations were of little consequence, however, to the imperial government 
that was more focused on maximizing its strategic and military gains from any subsidy or 
investment. Thus while joining Canada in 1889 to subsidize a North Pacific route from 
Vancouver to Yokohama, Shanghai, and Hong Kong (with contributions of £45,000 and 
£15,000, respectively), it could not see its way to support the CA Line nor its extension 
across the Atlantic, for which Huddart sought a total subsidy of £300,000. The North Pacific 
route offered Britain the advantages of an alternate pathway to possessions in India and China 
in the advent of hostilities in the Mediterranean and any potential blockade of the Suez Canal. 
A connection to Sydney had no such pressing strategic importance. With Canada’s backing, 
Huddart lobbied imperial authorities throughout the 1890s, setting out advantages for the 
carriage of mail and passengers, trade, and defense, rounding off his appeal by concluding it 
“is of such an Imperial nature as to make it historic.”
28
 Promoters of an “All Red” Pacific 
telegraph cable between Canada and Australia couched its merits along similar lines, but that 
project also stalled in its quest to secure Britain’s backing. 
Besides reflecting strategic priorities, this refusal revealed concerns that new centers 
of regional influence might spring up wholly independent of Britain, marginalizing London 
as a global and imperial hub of power and information.
29
 But a sea route did not require the 
same initial outlay or fixed track infrastructure as a cable or rail network and thus was not as 
hamstrung without Britain. It could also be terminated easily by pulling off the ships and this, 
Melbourne’s Argus insisted, “renders it easy” for a government to take the plunge and “really 
test the value of the project” while risking little.
30
 In some respects, by declining to support it, 
 
Britain ceded the Pacific to the white settler colonies that were now in a position to forge 
links without direct reference to the metropole. In any case, the CA Line was not a suitable 
trade route for Australasian producers in British markets given the difficulties of 
transshipment to Canada’s Atlantic coast. Beyond improved postal communication, the 
prospect of intra-Pacific trade between Australia and Canada, and with Fiji and Hawaii, 
caught the colonial imagination (but such commercial advantages, Britain stressed, would not 
motivate its support).
31
 Indeed, the route appeared to express a natural and self-supporting 
complementarity. As Ward put it to the British Columbia Board of Trade: “Here you have, as 
the basis of exchange, reversed seasons, different climates and varying natural wealth. And 
the tropical waters between the two countries are studded with islands of great fertility and 
capable of supplying many products which are now imported from more distant territories.”
32
 
To promote such a trade entailed a challenge to established hubs of Pacific exchange, 
suggestive of the route’s value beyond strictly British lines. San Francisco dominated trade to 
Hawaii by the late nineteenth century. The CA Line put Washington and Oregon in closer 
communication with Hawaii (via Vancouver), newly enabling a section of the Pacific coast 
that had been “practically cut off from the trade of Honolulu” to compete with San 
Francisco.
33
 A north–south feeder rail had recently opened between Vancouver and Seattle, 
“integrating these frontiers into a binational borderland economy,” as Kornel Chang outlines, 
and this might now extend westward into the Pacific.
34
 The San Francisco Call reported on 
the inauguration of the CA Line under the headline, “After Our Trade: A Scheme Directly 
Designed to Injure San Francisco’s Commerce,” and cited Vancouver’s growing trade with 
Honolulu.
35
 Yet Canada was primarily concerned with ease of transshipment. At Vancouver 
the Canadian Pacific Railway facilitated a direct connection across the continent. To 
transship from Pacific steamers at San Francisco and enter Canada along the fragmented U.S. 
rail network entailed a journey along two or three lines. This gave the CA Line “the 
 
advantage for us,” the Canadian trade commissioner in Sydney stressed, rather than the 
prospect of undercutting Californian monopoly over Pacific trade.
36
 
Still, if not to displace California, it was a “decided advantage to Canada to connect 
with a tropical country,” Ward asserted.
37
 His pitch dovetailed with an emerging Canadian 
interest in the tropics. Access to tropical territory was imagined as “crucial to national 
development and the fulfilment of Canada’s ‘destiny’ in the hemisphere,” as historian Paula 
Hastings has recently observed with reference to the West Indies.
38
 In fact, the subsidization 
of the Pacific service sparked proposals from other interested parties for parallel shipping 
lines to the West Indies, a region seemingly ripe for Canadian annexation and the focus of 
significant investment in banking and utilities infrastructure.
39
 The prospect of a Canada 
aligned to the tropics appealed initially to the centers of population density closest to the 
Atlantic coast, and support of the CA Line did not prompt parallel campaigns for the 
extension of Canadian sovereignty over islands in the Pacific. 
The new ideology of tropical colonization in other bastions of white settlement served 
to weaken route connections. Although the service was ostensibly “All Red,” Honolulu in the 
Hawaiian Kingdom was not part of the British Pacific. Hawaiian sovereignty came under 
direct challenge with the overthrow of the Indigenous monarchy by American citizens in 
1893 and the institution of an independent republic. After the United States annexed Hawaii 
in 1898 and incorporated the island group as part of its territory in 1900, it placed protective 
duties against Australian and Canadian goods, while also terminating the carrying trade to 
and from U.S. territory contiguous to Vancouver.
40
 
In other ways, the extension of white settler domination might improve route 
connections. The Australian colonies were on a course to federation in the late nineteenth 
century, forming the six states of the Commonwealth in 1901. New Zealand interests 
expressed concern that an “enlarged” Australia would promote a faster Pacific mail service to 
 
its continued exclusion. Accordingly, New Zealand needed to “retain and acquire as many 
islands as possible” to forestall Australia, for “if we are outside the line of mail route between 
Australia and North America, Samoa and Fiji are fairly on it.”
41
 I now turn to the immediate 
effect of growing colonial nationalism, intercolonial competition, and British–U.S. rivalry on 
the operation of the “All Red” route. 
 
Early Twentieth-Century Realignments 
Throughout the 1890s, colonial governments tested the value of the CA Line as Melbourne’s 
Argus had encouraged. Ships stopped calling at Suva when Fiji withdrew its subsidy (£1,500) 
in late 1895 until 1897, and again between 1899 and 1902. Wellington replaced Brisbane for 
fifteen months from mid-1898 until the revival of a Brisbane call. This uncertain operating 
environment contributed to the liquidation of Huddart’s venture in 1898 and the route was 
placed under a caretaker arrangement. He was “never really the same man” after failing to 
secure Britain’s backing for the transatlantic extension and died bankrupt and destitute in 
1901. The “All Red” route, one obituary concluded, was conceived “before its proper time.”
42
 
Its flagging career echoed previous struggles over the operation of the parallel Sydney–San 
Francisco route, when individual colonies and businessmen-financiers were unwilling to 
make long-term commitments or investments. By the late 1890s, with managerial capitalism 




 New exclusions along the San Francisco route prompted a shift in ownership of the 
CA Line. Following the annexation of Hawaii, Honolulu became a coastal port of the United 
States, with foreign ships barred from coasting between Hawaii and California. What had 
been from 1885 a joint operation by the Oceanic Steamship Company of San Francisco and 
the Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand (USSCo), the Sydney–San Francisco 
 
service (via Honolulu) was now placed solely in American hands. Not discouraged from 
engaging in the transpacific sphere, the USSCo mobilized its experience and reputation for 
sound management to take a half-share in the management of the CA Line in 1901 (securing 
full ownership in 1910). 
 The exclusionary policies of the new “white” Australian nation presented other 
challenges. Mail contracts were now a federal responsibility. When the CA Line came up for 
renewal in 1903, Prime Minister Edmund Barton advised the USSCo that, excepting NSW 
and Queensland, the states were largely indifferent to the route. However, he perceived “it 
would be a popular thing for a Federal Government in connection with the cry for a ‘White 
Australia’ to favour a local line employing local men.”
44
 The legislative framework of White 
Australia, enshrined in the Immigration Restriction Act, the Pacific Island Labourers Act, and 
the Post and Telegraph Act, all of 1901, sought to exclude and deport non-Europeans from 
the new nation. Such racialized boundary marking exposed new tensions in a multiracial 
empire.
45
 The Post and Telegraph Act enforced a preferential white labor clause on mail 
steamers under federal contract. This targeted the premier imperial firm, P&O, which 
employed Indian crew on the Suez route. The CA Line, as Barton perceived, might offer 
some leverage if P&O demanded higher subsidies in compensation for carrying white crew at 
higher wages.
46
 From 1903, Australia granted the CA Line two-year renewals, also seeing its 
value in countering growing American commercial competition and in promoting trade with 
Canada despite continued poor returns.
47
 Unlike the Indian Ocean, the Pacific was more 
immediately a domain of settler-driven engagements, with the accompanying assertion of “all 
British” as “all white.” 
The transoceanic projects and ambitions of Britain’s settler colonies and the United 
States in the Pacific were at once interdependent and in tension. The Australasian colonies 
originally hoped that opening a link between Sydney and Vancouver might signal to the 
 
United States their dissatisfaction with the operation of the Sydney–San Francisco service. 
American steamers employed Chinese labor, and the U.S. government, unlike Canada, 
offered no subsidies. The United States also placed protective tariffs against colonial 
produce.
48
 This tension was felt most acutely in New Zealand, which, in contrast to Australia, 
was forced to continue subsidizing the Sydney–San Francisco service even after it passed into 
American hands because it was its only direct link across the Pacific and onward to Britain. 
Even this line was suspended in 1906 following the San Francisco earthquake. Meanwhile, 
however, the American connection ignited periodic anxiety, and in subsidy renewal debates 
political leaders variously stressed history and kinship to claim America as merely “one big 
British colony,” or took a more pragmatic line, arguing that networks (and the commerce they 
promoted) ultimately mattered more than their imperial and national connections. As the 
minister of industries and commerce, Joseph Ward, put it in 1904: “Trade follows the flag but 
nowadays it is the flag of the steamship-line, not particularly the flag of any country, though 
naturally we favour the supporting of our own.”
49
 
The fact that New Zealand continued to subsidize Oceanic’s service to San Francisco 
(known as the Australia and America Line, or A&A Line), underlined the extent to which it 
kept its Pacific connections in pragmatic perspective. Perhaps it was no small consolation that 
U.S. shipping could not rival British operations until the interwar years nor deploy the kind of 
earth-girding rhetoric underpinning British claims to global maritime ascendancy. For its 
part, Oceanic too tried to insert itself into the Pacific within a system facilitating imperial 
mobility, including drawing on the ideology of the empire to entice British and colonial 
passengers. As its brochures queried: “Have you Traveled Homeward via the A&A line? If 
not through America, why not!”
50
 Shorter than the CA Line, the route via San Francisco—the 
“geographical route” and “the old gateway” to England, as Oceanic’s New Zealand agent 
stressed—offered colonial travelers a quicker and more convenient route to the mother 
 
country. In doing so it sought to displace any performance of empire loyalty implicit in the 
choice of the company (and route) to the final destination.
51
 However, in the interwar years, 
American shipping began to represent an imperial as well as commercial threat in the face of 
British wartime losses and underinvestment in its mercantile marine. Appeals to “patriotic 
travel” became more strident as a means to promote the Sydney–Vancouver service, which 
meanwhile had also developed a New Zealand leg of call.
52
 
The “All Red” route never lost its capacity to stir imperial debate. At the 1907 
Colonial Conference speed emerged as a matter for high politics when the Canadian prime 
minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier, reviving Huddart’s mission, moved a resolution for a fast “All 
Red” service across the Atlantic and Pacific, connecting Britain, Canada, and Australia.
53
 
Achieving increases in speed of even a few knots on this route was estimated to involve 
considerable additional running costs and significantly higher government subsidies. As 
against the current subsidy of about £60,000 on imperial shipping in the Pacific (divided 
between Canada, Australia, and Fiji in the amounts of £37,090, £26,258, and £2,282, 
respectively), a realistic annual subsidy for the faster service across both oceans was 
estimated at £800,000, nearly half of which would have to come from Britain. Moreover, the 
construction of the proposed four fast ships for the Atlantic and five for the Pacific would be 
well in excess of £6,000,000.
54
 The conference unanimously affirmed the (nonbinding) 
resolution whose only practical effect may have been to distract from the more modest 
improvements that companies such as the USSCo sought, leaving its director James Mills to 
lament the resolution as “wild talk.”
55
 
Metropolitan commentators also expressed dismay at the proposals, and in doing so 
reasserted imperial priorities defined from London. Stillborn proposals for a faster “All Red” 
route were perhaps the first victims of Britain’s naval strategists seeking to confront the 
growing German naval threat by increasing burden sharing within the empire. Despite his 
 
reputation as an imperialist, the naval strategist Sir John Colomb deprecated a fast “All Red” 
route, once heralded as the practical expression of imperial kinship, as “the practical example 
of a spurious patriotism.” Colonial politicians, he contended, should contribute to naval 
upkeep before making demands for new investments in commercial sea routes. Britain had no 
claim over the “world’s commonage”; its true sea responsibilities, he asserted, were naval.
56
 
These views echoed liberal opinion, the Economist unsurprisingly rejecting the 
“glorification” of “All Red” routes as running “counter to geography” and representing “a 




Britain’s Board of Trade considered the scheme, but dismissed it on the grounds that 
the transpacific leg would never pay. Canada, hopeful that combined Dominion pressure 
might encourage Britain to reconsider, lobbied Australia unsuccessfully.
58
 By late 1909 the 
express scheme was “dead.”
59
 Australia withdrew its Pacific subsidies in 1911, believing the 
Suez and Cape of Good Hope routes were adequate (the latter no less “All Red,” Prime 
Minister Andrew Fisher declared, in linking Australia and South Africa).
60
 New Zealand’s 
diminished status was finally surmounted when, at Canada’s insistence, the 1911 contract 
included Auckland in preference to Brisbane.
61
 The route was renamed the “Canadian 
Australasian” Line to better reflect this (Canada granted £37,000, New Zealand £20,000, and 
Fiji £5,000). This represented the final itinerary alteration until the route’s termination four 
decades later in 1953.
62
 
A federated Australia might turn its back on the service, but NSW’s long-standing 
importance as a hub of Pacific shipping and trade could not be reversed so easily. Even 
without Australian subsidies Sydney remained the terminal port. The commercial logic of the 
network in a sense trumped the fractured political commitment toward it. Yet New Zealand 
now represented to Australia a series of obstructions over and above cost in time. A call at 
 
Auckland was “a drawback and a danger to Australia,” Senator James McColl protested, 
citing cases where prospective migrants were persuaded to leave ships there instead of 
continuing to Sydney.
63
 New Zealand exporters received preference for refrigerated cargo 
space over Australian requests, preempting them on the Canadian market. Canada admitted 
New Zealand produce at lower rates than Australian goods on the basis of their 1904 
preferential tariff agreement. To grant an Australian subsidy would now equate to supporting 
a trade competitor. There was “no unfriendly feeling in Australia,” stressed Fisher, but it was 
a “matter of business, and there is very little sentiment in business when we are dealing with 





The “All Red” route, in the words of the British Conservative MP Sir George Baden-Powell 
in 1891, was predicted to become a “great Imperial artery, distributing life-blood all along its 
course, and assisting, with national pulsations, to develop oneness of aim and close co-
operation among all these great provinces of the British Empire.”
65
 Organic metaphors that 
connected the empire with the human body were typical of the era, as new transport and 
communications technologies made it possible to conceive of empire in its global entirety for 
the first time.
66
 Splashes of red across world maps communicated the extent of Britain’s 
extraterritorial reach (even as sovereignty over these spaces was highly contested), yet the 
challenge remained to secure reliable connections between possessions dispersed across vast 
oceans. Integrated sea and rail routes would hold the empire together. Framing the steamer 
line between Vancouver and Sydney as empire’s “missing link” made it appear pressing and, 
indeed, imperative to bridge the Pacific in this way, a connection that would complete the 
imperial circuit of the globe. 
 
Although propelled by ideals of global (Anglo) Britishness, without metropolitan 
backing the CA Line was effectively a settler-colonial project, orienting Canada and 
Australia to each other and the Pacific realm between. For proponents of the line, the two 
colonies had the “same mission in the outer Empire,” as Fleming put it, and this connection 
would foster understanding of a shared investment in building up civilization in new world 
territories. The Australian colonies, uncomfortable in their geographic proximity to Asia, 
would be placed in their “correct” cultural hemisphere through closer connections with 
Canada, learning from the progress of their white brethren. While these strongholds at the 
ocean’s rim might themselves be cohering as sites of racial exclusion, this was an expansive 
ideology, championing the ocean being carved out as a space for white mobility. 
The route promised a mutually reassuring connection between two outposts of settler 
colonialism, but it was more than merely a means of physically bridging the gulf between 
Canada and Australia. Its promised mobilities promoted the expression of settler-colonial 
identity that was more overtly “white-minded” than Britain with its professions of multiracial 
imperial citizenship. Nor should the success or otherwise of the line, or the many pressures 
and constraints with which it had to contend, be allowed to distract from the expansive 
ideological visions to which it gave expression, both within and beyond the empire. In the 
longer run it became a prelude to reimagining a Pacific subdued into a benign, affirming, and 
familiar space by intensified settler activity, in which tropical island colonies were 
domesticated into secure nodes for white traffic and trade. The accompanying rhetoric 
mirrored the promise of “empty” lands, fashioning the Pacific as a virgin ocean and a new 
frontier, a natural domain for extending settler-colonial power and influence, and offering 
prospects of new markets, resources, and wealth. A self-assertive challenge to the imperial 
metropole, a zone of commerce unmediated by it across the Pacific between Canada and 
 
Australia and with the United States and the islands in between, reinforced from a material 
standpoint, this “white” vision of the Pacific in a nominally multiracial empire. 
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